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Superbriefs™ case briefs
August 27, 2006
Rom Law™ now has over 11,000 Superbriefs™ casebriefs
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are heavily edited and they almost always delete a dissent
that explains the case.
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION V. GERAGHTY
445 U.S. 388 (1980)
CASE: This was an appeal of a Court of Appeals decision to
hear an appeal of a trial court's denial of a class
certification after the plaintiff's personal claim had
become moot.
FACTS: The Parole Commission (D) adopted explicit release
guidelines for adult prisoners in 1973. In 1976, Congress
enacted a reorganization of the parole commission and
required the new Parole Commission to promulgate rules and
regulations for parole of any eligible prisoner. Geraghty
(P) was convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion and of
making false declarations to a grand jury. P was sentenced
to concurrent prison terms of four years on the conspiracy
count and one year on the false declaration count. P moved
under Rule FRCP 35 and got the sentenced reduced to 30
months. P then applied for release on parole and that was
denied; under the rules he could not get parole before he
served his entire sentence (see page 523 Rosenberg 5th). P
applied again and the application was denied for the same
reasons as the first. P then sued under a class action
challenging the parole guidelines. The request for class
certification was denied. P appealed. On June 30, 1977, P
was released from prison by serving 22 months and the
earning of good time credits. D then moved to dismiss the
appeals as moot. The court of appeals ruled that the
litigation was not moot.
ISSUE: Can an erroneous denial of class certification and
then a subsequent mootness in the claim of the class
plaintiff render the matter moot? Does the question whether
a particular person is a proper party to maintain the
action, by its own force, raise separation of powers
problems related to improper judicial interference in areas
committed to other branches of the Federal Government?
RULE OF LAW: An action brought on behalf of a class does
not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's
substantive claim, even though class certification has been
denied, since the proposed representative of the class
retains a "personal stake" in obtaining class certification
sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not
undermined. The question whether a particular person is a
proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own
force, raise separation of powers problems related to
improper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government. See other rules below.
HOLDING AND DECISION: (Blackmun, Justice) Can an erroneous
denial of class certification and then a subsequent
mootness in the claim of the class plaintiff render the
matter moot? No. Does the question whether a particular
person is a proper party to maintain the action, by its own
force, raise separation of powers problems related to
improper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government? No. The fact that a
named plaintiff's substantive claims are mooted due to an
occurrence other than a judgment on the merits does not
mean that all other issues in the case are mooted. A
plaintiff who brings a class action presents two separate
issues, one being the claim on the merits and the other
being the claim that he is entitled to represent a class.
"The denial of class certification stands as an
adjudication of one of the issues litigated," and, in
determining whether the plaintiff may continue to press the
class certification claim after the claim on the merits
"expires," the nature of the "personal stake" in the class
certification claim must be examined. P filed the action as
a class representative. A positive disposition of the
matter was made prior to P's personal claim becoming moot.
This does not render the class action moot in that P has
the right to appeal the decision of the District Court on
behalf of the class. Mootness has two aspects: "when the
issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome." It is clear
that the controversy over the validity of the Parole
Release Guidelines is still a "live" one between
petitioners and at least some members of the class
respondent seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the
fact that prisoners currently affected by the guidelines
have moved to be substituted, or to intervene, as "named"
respondents in this Court. We therefore are concerned here
with the second aspect of mootness, that is, the parties'
interest in the litigation. The question whether a
particular person is a proper party to maintain the action
does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers
problems related to improper judicial interference in areas
committed to other branches of the Federal Government. . .
. Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal
court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related
only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will
be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. It
is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems
is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction
has "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,"
Baker v. Carr, and whether the dispute touches upon "the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,"
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth. We therefore hold that
an action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot
upon expiration of the named plaintiff's substantive claim
even though class certification has been denied. If the
appeals results in reversal of the denial of class
certification, the merits of the claim can then be
adjudicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna. In Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), we held that mootness of the
named plaintiff's individual claim after a class has been
duly certified does not render the action moot. It reasoned
that, even though appellees . . . might not again enforce
the Iowa durational residency requirement against [the
class representative], it is clear that they will enforce
it against those persons in the class that appellant sought
to represent and that the District Court certified. This
does not mean that P is entitled to continue litigating the
interests of the class if the denial is repealed. The
judgment of the court of appeals is vacated and the issue
is remanded to determine if P is the proper party to press
the claims of the class or whether another representative
is proper. This case demonstrates the flexible character of
the Art. III mootness doctrine. As has been noted in the
past, Art. III justiciability is "not a legal concept with
a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification."
Dissenting: (Powell, Justice) The majority says that
mootness is a "flexible" doctrine, which may be adapted as
we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. The
Court holds that the named plaintiff has a right "analogous
to the private attorney general concept" to appeal the
denial of class certification even when his personal claim
for relief is moot. Both steps are significant departures
from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the
narrow issue presented in this case. Recent decisions of
this Court have considered the personal stake requirement
with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset
of litigation as a question of standing to sue, we have
held that the personal stake requirement has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the
other, it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on
the exercise of judicial power. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: In order to
satisfy Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant. The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing
or threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. The
core requirement of a personal stake in the outcome is not
"flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation by those
who have no interest of their own at stake is applied so
rigorously that it has been termed the "one major
proposition" in the law of standing to which "the federal
courts have consistently adhered . . . without exception."
We have insisted upon the personal stake requirement in
mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the
case or controversy limitation imposed by the Constitution,
"founded in concern about the proper -- and properly
limited -- role of the courts in a democratic society." No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer
has any personal stake in the litigation. The Court
announces today for the first time -- and without
attempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary --
that there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness
doctrine:" "flexible" and "less flexible." In Sosna, the
Court simply acknowledged that actual class certification
gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties.
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this
action into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may
be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii)
that the class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since
no class has been certified, the Court concedes that the
claim on the merits is moot. But respondent is said to have
a personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack
of a stake in the merits. The Court makes no effort to
identify any injury to respondent that may be redressed by,
or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a
favorable ruling on the certification question. Instead,
respondent's "personal stake" is said to derive from two
factors having nothing to do with concrete injury or stake
in the outcome. First, the Court finds that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure create a "right," "analogous to
the private attorney general concept," to have a class
certified. Second, the Court thinks that the case retains
the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply
presented issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii)
a self-interested party actually contesting the case. The
Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 23 is
misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not confer
federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. Since
neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general concept
can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception
of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. The Court cites no
decision that has premised jurisdiction upon the bare
existence of a sharply presented issue in a concrete and
vigorously argued case, and I am aware of none. Any attempt
to identify a personal stake in such ancillary "claims"
often must end in frustration, for they are not claims in
any ordinary sense of the word. A motion for class
certification, like a motion to join additional parties or
to try the case before a jury instead of a judge, seeks
only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable
resolution of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the
moving party is neither expected nor required to assert an
interest in them independent of his interest in the merits.
LEGAL ANALYSIS: P was only the representative of the class
and if his claim is moot, the only issue generated is
whether P is the proper party to represent the class; it
does not mean the class cannot litigate its claims. The
dissent, which is not in any of the casebooks, clearly
shows that this is not as cut and dry as one would be lead
to believe. The dissent also gives you an alternative
number of rules of law for the case as it frames the
argument of the majority for you which is why we imagine
that it is not in any casebooks: "The majority says that
mootness is a "flexible" doctrine, which may be adapted as
we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. The
Court holds that the named plaintiff has a right "analogous
to the private attorney general concept" to appeal the
denial of class certification even when his personal claim
for relief is moot. Both steps are significant departures
from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the
narrow issue presented in this case. Recent decisions of
this Court have considered the personal stake requirement
with some care."
The class action law suit is an exception so long as the
controversy is live. This also avoids the ability of the
defendant to end a class action on a technicality by
offering the lead plaintiff a sweetheart settlement. The
court was also clear to make sure that if P won the appeal
for class certification, he still may be removed as he may
not be deemed to represent the class effectively if his
personal stake in the outcome is mooted. But that issue is
separate from the issue of the appeal in the first instance.
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